Home Election Administration Immigration Enforcement Reached the Sheriff’s Office. Voters Are Responding

Immigration Enforcement Reached the Sheriff’s Office. Voters Are Responding

In Alamance County, North Carolina, the most visible obstacle in Shannon Long’s campaign for sheriff was sometimes his own campaign van.

The van carried the word “sheriff.” Long, a pastor, business owner and former deputy, told The Associated Press that some Latino residents were so distrustful of law enforcement that they hesitated to speak with him.

Long defeated longtime Republican Sheriff Terry Johnson on November 3, 2026, after promising to reduce cooperation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The election does not prove that immigration policy alone caused Johnson’s defeat. Johnson pointed to his long tenure and the broader political environment, while local supporters defended his record.

But the campaign revealed something larger: federal immigration enforcement has become part of the political identity of local sheriff’s offices. In some counties, voters are now deciding not only who will run the jail or patrol rural roads, but whether the sheriff’s department should participate in a federal immigration system at all.

A federal program with a county address

The mechanism at the center of the debate is the 287(g) program. Under the program, ICE enters written agreements with state or local law-enforcement agencies and trains designated officers to perform limited immigration-enforcement functions under ICE supervision.

ICE’s Jail Enforcement Model fact sheet describes a system in which participating officers identify people in state or local custody who may be subject to immigration proceedings and coordinate with ICE before release. The local agency does not simply become ICE, and the agreement does not give every deputy unlimited immigration authority. The specific model, training, duties and supervision matter.

That distinction can disappear in a local campaign. Residents often encounter the policy through a jail, a booking decision, a detainer request or a sheriff’s public statements. The technical limits of an agreement may be less politically important than the basic question of whether the sheriff’s office is perceived as a partner in federal deportation efforts.

ICE reported a rapid expansion of the program during 2026. The AP described more than 2,700 agreements with state and local agencies, up from 135 when President Donald Trump began his second term. More than 29,000 local officers had been deputized, and 287(g)-related arrests accounted for about 15% of ICE arrests in July, according to government data obtained by the Deportation Data Project and analyzed by FWD.us.

Those figures help explain why sheriffs have become important to the administration’s enforcement strategy. They also explain why the program has become visible in elections that are otherwise dominated by familiar local concerns such as staffing, jail conditions, roads and public safety.

Alamance shows the trust problem

Alamance County’s sheriff’s office still participates in 287(g), according to a department spokesman cited by the AP, although the county ended an agreement to house ICE detainees last year.

The distinction matters administratively. It did not necessarily matter to residents who viewed the sheriff’s office as connected to immigration enforcement.

Alamance is a longtime Republican stronghold between Greensboro and the Research Triangle. Its Latino population has grown substantially, from roughly 750 residents identifying as Hispanic in the 1990 census to nearly 25,000 in 2020, according to the AP. The election therefore took place in a county where demographic change and law-enforcement policy were already meeting each other in daily life.

Community organizers and residents told the AP that some Latino residents feared contact with the sheriff’s office and, in some cases, hesitated to report crimes or interact with authorities. Those accounts are not a countywide measurement of trust, and they do not establish that every resident shared the same view. They do show why a sheriff’s decision to cooperate with ICE can become more than an administrative arrangement.

Long has said he will uphold the law and hold offenders accountable, but he also said he will not participate in the 287(g) program. He has begun meeting with Latino residents in an effort to rebuild relationships.

That is a different kind of local policy promise from simply supporting or opposing immigration enforcement. It asks whether the sheriff’s office can remain a credible law-enforcement institution for residents who fear that contact with local officers may lead to federal immigration consequences.

The election pattern is real, but limited

Alamance was not the only county where ICE cooperation became politically significant.

In Frederick County, Maryland, Republican Sheriff Chuck Jenkins lost to Karl Bickel after Maryland enacted a law banning immigration-enforcement agreements with the federal government. Jenkins argued that the program improved public safety and said its end would create problems. He also acknowledged that the issue likely contributed to his defeat.

In Wisconsin’s Winnebago County, an ICE arrest and detention involving a schoolteacher before Election Day intensified scrutiny of candidates associated with the county’s 287(g) agreement. The sheriff’s department was not involved in that arrest, but the agreement became central to the campaign. Democrat Jason Rippl promised to end it and won the election, according to the AP.

The AP reviewed roughly 250 sheriff’s elections involving offices with 287(g) agreements and found contests in North Carolina, Wisconsin, Indiana, Maryland and elsewhere where the pacts played a role in a candidate’s defeat. That is evidence of a developing political vulnerability, not a national referendum.

Many sheriffs ran unopposed. In some counties, cooperation with ICE may remain popular or may be viewed as legally required. In others, the policy may be interpreted as an inappropriate use of local resources or a threat to police-community relationships.

The same federal program can therefore produce different political results depending on the county’s demographics, local history, jail practices, candidate field and recent enforcement incidents.

What can a new sheriff actually change?

The campaign question is often simple: Will the new sheriff end cooperation with ICE?

The legal answer may be more complicated.

North Carolina’s Border Protection Act, enacted as Senate Bill 153, directs specified state agencies to enter agreements with ICE under Section 287(g), develop immigration-status inquiry procedures and cooperate with ICE within the limits of federal law. The North Carolina General Assembly’s summary identifies the Department of Public Safety, Department of Adult Correction, State Highway Patrol and State Bureau of Investigation as agencies covered by the law.

That does not automatically answer what an elected county sheriff may do with a local agreement. Ending a voluntary federal memorandum, changing jail procedures, declining discretionary activities and complying with a state cooperation requirement are different legal and operational questions.

For Long, the first test will be less dramatic than a national announcement. It will involve reviewing the current agreement, identifying which deputies or jail employees are trained or authorized, determining what functions they perform, and explaining which parts of the system the sheriff can change without violating state or federal law.

That process will also reveal the financial side of the arrangement. Counties may bear costs involving training, equipment, staff time, detention, transportation, legal exposure and recordkeeping. The available reporting does not yet establish the total taxpayer cost in Alamance County or show whether participation produces measurable savings or public-safety gains.

The sheriff’s office is becoming a federalism battleground

Immigration enforcement is often described as a federal responsibility. Legally, that remains an important starting point. Operationally, however, enforcement increasingly depends on local institutions.

County jails hold people before release. Local employees process records and respond to federal requests. Sheriffs explain the policy to voters. Residents decide whether the office is protecting the community, assisting a federal campaign or doing both.

That creates a direct accountability mechanism that does not exist for most federal immigration officials. A voter may have little influence over ICE’s national priorities, but that voter can replace a sheriff who makes local cooperation part of the office’s public identity.

The arrangement also creates a political risk for sheriffs who are not personally involved in every federal operation. The Winnebago County race showed how an enforcement incident can change the meaning of a local agreement even when the sheriff’s department did not conduct the arrest. Association may be enough to make cooperation an election issue.

The next question is whether the 2026 results remain isolated contests or become a durable pattern. The AP identified Florida, Texas and other states with large numbers of 287(g) agreements as likely areas of attention when more sheriffs face voters in 2028.

That future will not be determined only by national immigration rhetoric. It will depend on whether sheriffs can document what their agreements do, whether counties disclose the costs, whether residents believe local policing remains separate from federal deportation work, and whether state laws leave elected sheriffs meaningful discretion.

Federal immigration enforcement has acquired a local political infrastructure. In Alamance County and elsewhere, voters are beginning to decide whether that infrastructure belongs inside the sheriff’s office—and whether a department can enforce the law effectively after the trust that makes local policing possible has weakened.